From: Wright, Richard <Rwright@kentlaw.edu>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Date: 23/01/2010 19:26:47 UTC
Subject: RE: Duty, and Breaking Eggs

Catching up on earlier points.
 
I totally agree with Michael on the irrelevance of the contract in this case.  Not only Donoghue, but McPherson upon which Donoghue relied correctly freed tort liability from the notion that, just because a contract is involved, conduct that absent the contract would be negligent and subject to liability should be treated as not subject to liability due to lack of privity of contract.  Anyone serving food with eggs at a Sikh religious event, regardless of whether or not they are doing so pursuant to a contract, arguably should have a duty to warn attendees of the presence of the eggs given the foreseeable risk to those allergic to eggs who arguably reasonably rely on eggs not being in food at a Sikh religious event.  The tort duty arises independent of the contract.
 
In regards to one of Andrew's other points, quoted here:
 
'[Darby v. National Trust is] cited in the judgments in Bhamra. . . .  Although it's cited for the proposition that you can't claim for a kind of damage different from that which was foreseeable, it's actually very close to Bhamra. Pour memoire: claimant swims in an ornamental pond and drowns. His widow can't complain that the pond ought to have been fenced against foolish swimmers, but tries to latch on to the fact that the occupiers happen to have been negligent in failing to prevent those in contact with the water getting Weil's disease. Quite rightly she fails. As Mr Bhamra ought to have."

 

Andrew is right that Darby is correctly decided, but IMHO wrong that it is very close to Bhamra and that Bhamra should have been decided the same way (no liability).  In Bhamra the injury resulted from one of the foreseeable risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent (the allergy risk).  That was not the case in Darby, in which the foreseeable risk that arguably made the non-fencing negligent (getting Weil's disease from contact with the water) was not realized; rather, a different risk (drowning in the water) was realized, which however was not one of the risks that made the defendant's conduct negligent.  Thus, as the Bhamra court stated, in Darby there is a lack of attributable responsibility ('proximate' causation) because the harm did not result from the actual or anticipated realization of one of the risks that made the conduct negligent, while in Bhamra there is attributable responsibility because the harm did result from the realization of one of the risks that made the conduct negligent.

 

Note that, as I explain at length in my previously cited San Diego article, the 'harm results from the risk' formulation (which is how the limitation is phrased in the Resatement Third) is quite different from the 'harm matches the foreseeable risk' or 'harm within the foreseeable risk' limitation with which it is often confused (and was phrased in the initial draft of the Retatement Third, prior to myself and a number of others pointing out the difference and its significance).  The 'harm results from the risk' formulation interpolates between Cardozo's and Andrews' positions on attributable responsibility (whether phrased as duty or proximate cause limitations), and it is consistent with the American and English cases, while the 'harm matches the risk' formulation is not (again, see my San Diego article).

Finally, a plea to Andrew: would you consider putting your comments on top of the copied correspondence, as everyone else does?  It is not only somewhat burdensome to have to scroll all the way down to find your comment, but I often forget that this is your practice and, as occurred during the exchanges on this issue, simply assume that you are re-forwarding others' comments and do not think to scroll down to the bottom to note that you have added a new comment.

 

- Richard

 


From: Jones, Michael [mailto:M.A.Jones@liverpool.ac.uk]
Sent: Fri 1/22/2010 5:04 AM
To: Andrew Tettenborn; Hedley, Steve
Cc: obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: RE: Duty, and Breaking Eggs

"The result in Bhamra essentially allows Bhamra to complain that a breach of contract by Lucky Caterers vis-a-vis the hosts gives rise to liability to him a third party foreseeably injured as a result. It's that that strikes me as outre -- particularly as Bhamra had abandoned, presumably as hopeless, a claim under the Contracts (Rights of TP) Act 1999."
 
Wasn't that Stevenson's objection to the imposition of a duty of care in Donoghue v Stevenson?  Many tort duties arise out of breaches of contract vis-a-vis third parties, but though it may be a factor to be thrown into the mix, it is no longer considered to be the determining issue in deciding whether a duty should be owed.
 
Michael
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Michael A. Jones
Professor of Common Law
Liverpool Law School
University of Liverpool
Liverpool
L69 3BX
 
Phone: (0)151 794 2821
Fax:     (0)151 794 2829
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